A Missive from the Chairman

It is more than a little ironic that Philip Yeo, of 3.8 GPA requirement fame, who started the “Chairman’s Honours List” where scholars with perfect grades would have their names proudly published in the local newspapers and engraved on a physical honour roll in Biopolis and get to share a table with the man himself at tea sessions, should send A* scholars this article for their reading pleasure. For here is what it says (amongst other things):

Getting to an elite college, being at an elite college, and going on from an elite college—all involve numerical rankings: SAT, GPA, GRE. You learn to think of yourself in terms of those numbers. They come to signify not only your fate, but your identity; not only your identity, but your value. It’s been said that what those tests really measure is your ability to take tests, but even if they measure something real, it is only a small slice of the real. The problem begins when students are encouraged to forget this truth, when academic excellence becomes excellence in some absolute sense, when “better at X” becomes simply “better.”

Of course, Yeo might not have agreed with this particular paragraph in the essay. Perhaps the article was sent to scholars for the purpose of encouraging them to attend cheaper public universities rather than elite private universities, thus saving A* some money.

Eat Less and Stop Complaining

In today’s Home section we have a blatant attempt to fan inflation worries by yet another “cheap meals” feature. This time, based on a survey by Case on cheap hawker food. We are handed the cheerful statistic of 62% of 388 stalls surveyed having one-portion dishes that cost less than $2.50. Smuggled in halfway through the article is the following:

The mystery diners focused on the prices and did not consider the quality or quantity of the samples.

So, for all we know, portions could be shrinking proportionately to inflation, so the statistics presented might not mean anything at all. In fact, they interview a hawker who admits that he just serves smaller portions to keep prices the same. So, for those who really need cheap food, the solution is to… eat less? Good advice for those who need to eat less for health reasons, but for everyone else?

ERP, Part 2

More on the Choo Zheng Xi’s attack on ERP. He writes:

The syllogism by which [the government has] derived the solution is as follows:
1) There is congestion from people driving cars.
2) People drive less if they have to pay more.
3) Ergo, the more we make people pay, the less they will drive, hence eradicating the scourge of congestion.

Now, as anyone who has taken even just A-level economics knows, the consensus amongst economists that congestion pricing is good does not rest upon a mere ’syllogism’ of this type. Rather, it comes out of complex mathematical models that consider the social and private costs and benefits of congestion pricing. In the simplest cartoon model, without congestion pricing, the negative externalities of driving are not adequately charged for and the total amount consumed of a product is more than the maximally desirable amount for society. That is, when you do not charge people for polluting the public atmosphere and causing delays for other people, they will tend to consume too much of the product in question, where by ‘too much’ we mean ‘too much’ relative to the level of consumption that will maximise the benefit/cost difference. If you wish to know more about congestion pricing beyond this simple cartoon explanation, just search for “congestion pricing” on Google Scholar and you will get more information than you can read in your lifetime. Almost all of which is in favour of congestion pricing.

Of course, if you’re one of those who distrusts academics or economists and thinks their models are worthless, then all I can say is, I am much more inclined to take the word of experts who have researched the subject for years over yours. If you have some new argument, yet to be raised in the literature, against congestion pricing, by all means publish a paper on it. Plenty of mayors around the world who have to deal with the scourge of traffic congestion would love to know how they can get around the problem without introducing politically unpopular measures like road pricing (look at what happened to Ken Livingstone). Unfortunately for these mayors, at present, just as with Clinton and McCain’s ridiculous idea of a ‘gas tax holiday’, you’d be hard pressed to find an economist who would not recommend congestion pricing. And no, “it hurts my pocket” is no argument. It also hurts your pocket when you are fined for littering, but we don’t consider that as an argument against fines for littering.

Now, I actually agree with Zheng Xi on one point, and that is that it would be far easier to swallow congestion pricing if the revenues from it actually went back into improving transportation alternatives like public transit. At the moment, I don’t know if any of it actually goes to public transit. But if the government is serious about making people transition to public transit, it seems to me that they should have taken that line to sell the idea of ERP. Rather than merely spewing the usual robotic lines. All the same, the validity of this criticism of the government does not mean you are allowed to misrepresent the arguments for ERP as a silly syllogism, when there is actually a large body of detailed research supporting the social desirability of congestion pricing.

Singaporean Dream?

There are many of things wrong with this TOC article. The thought of tackling them all tires me, so let me do just one for now. Let us grant them the assumption that owning a car is part of ‘the Singaporean Dream’. Even so, it’s hardly the government’s moral obligation to Singaporeans fulfill their dreams. Whatever you think human rights are, the right to own a car is not one of them. By the logic used in that article, the government should also be obliged to subsidize housing to the extent that every Singaporean can own either a luxury condo or landed property. And, if it should one day become a widespread ambition of Singaporeans to, I don’t know, own an iPhone, then the government should be obliged to pony up for iPhone subsidies too. And those of us who don’t care for such material luxuries will have to pony up by way of increased taxes to grant our brethren their Singaporean Dreams.

I am puzzled.

How exactly does one mistake a blog post for an email, not just in any casual context, but when an arrest is involved?

So what is a fanatic?

I was debating for a long time whether or not to bother posting on this topic, because Walter Woon’s attack on human rights ‘fanatics’ was so obviously ludicrous that it seemed like bait to draw out angry responses (which would then justify his original label).

I bookmarked Today’s report on his speech and then decided not to bother blogging about it. Until I read the column by Lydia Lim in Saturday’s ST (Insight section) on the same issue. While, as is typical of ST columns, it took a much more conciliatory tone towards human rights advocates than Walter Woon did, in substance, it still used the same fallacious arguments and baseless smears. The ‘if you want to continue fighting for human rights then you’re just being troublesome and nasty‘ tone of the column got on my nerves enough that I decided I had to write something.

A summary of my main problems with Woon and Lim’s ‘arguments’:

  1. Vague and overly broad use of the term ‘fanatic’.
  2. Subsequent use of that term as a pejorative term. Together with 1., this allows them to imply that a broad swathe of their ideological opponents are Bad People. However, if they have indeed defined ‘fanatic’ too broadly, then this is a disingenuous insinuation.
  3. A complete misunderstanding of what universal human rights are. Or if not that, then a deliberate attempt to ignore the terms of the debate about universal human rights. (Siew Kum Hong has made a similar point.)
  4. Using relativism and then rejecting it as and when it suits their rhetorical purposes.

Here are the various sense of ‘fanatic’ that I can gather from Lim and Woon’s statements. Lim writes:

…a fanatic is one with whom it is very difficult to have a reasoned discussion. Such an individual is so extreme and fixed in his world view that he does not tolerate perspectives different from his own.

and

So the warning against fanaticism is a warning against close-mindedness and intolerance.

and

[Prof Woon’s] criticism was aimed not at human-rights activists but at those who are fanatical, that is, extreme, in their views.

And on Woon’s part:

You have, like in some religions, the fanatics. And it’s all hypocrisy and fanaticism (for these people) to set the views, as the leading spokesmen, of what is acceptable and what’s not.

and

…I said that for some people human rights has become a religion. This religion, like so many others, has its fanatics who display all the hypocrisy and zealotry of religious bigots.
They believe that there is only one permissible view of human rights — theirs. They assume that when they decide what human rights are, that decision is for the rest of humanity.

and

Human rights fanatics think that their opinion is the standard to which the rest of humanity must conform to and that they are entitled to issue reports criticising those who hold a different view. These are people who evidently believe that they and their values represent the apex of human moral development.
There is no one solution that will fit all societies.

and

I have never dismissed the sincerely-held views of anyone who is genuinely interested in dialogue.

From all the above, I gather the following characteristics of ‘fanatics’:

  • Someone with whom reasoned discussion is impossible and who is not ‘genuinely interested in dialogue’.
  • Someone with an extreme world view.
  • Someone with a fixed world view. (This goes with ‘close-mindedness’.)
  • Someone who thinks there exists a moral standard to which the rest of humanity must conform.

It should be clear by this point that those four characteristics do not always come together. For example, someone can believe in a universal principle of equal opportunities regardless of gender. Surely this does not qualify as an extreme world view. Rather, it would seem to be more common, even in Singapore, to think of male/female chauvinists as the extremists. One could of course rebut that whether a certain view is extreme depends on the prevailing social and cultural values of the society one happens to be in, and hence is a highly culture-relative concept. But that only serves to further undermine Woon’s point, for if the very charge of extremism is relative to what society one is situated in, then the only way one can not be an extremist is to bend with the prevailing wind — to adopt most of the dominant values of his/her society. People who were (say) against slavery in the 19th century were considered extremists, yet I suspect that even someone like Woon would have to admit that in some sense these people were right, despite not having held the socially dominant views of their time.

The same goes for fixity of world view. Again, I ask: does Woon think that there could (or did) exist a society in which slavery would not be immoral? If not, then he too has some fixed points in his world view. Note that we must disitinguish this kind of fixity from that of being impervious to new arguments and new knowledge. If we learn some new facts of the world or come across a new, sound, good, argument for why slavery is fine, then we should be willing to change our minds about the moral status of slavery. What is fixed, though, is the wrongness of slavery for all humans and all societies.

Finally, I would say that there are plenty of people who hold extreme world views but are capable of rational discussion. Just consider ethicists like Peter Singer, whom most people would consider to hold ‘extreme’ views with respect to animal rights (amongst other things), but with whom I think most would have to admit it’s more than possible to have a rational discussion. There are also plenty of people with moderate world views but who are incapable of rational discussion, mainly because they lack the ability to use logical principles and evidence to reflect on or defend their stances.

I hope I’ve done enough to show that the four characteristics attributed to ‘extremists’ by Lim and Woon do not, in fact, come in a package. By lumping them together, though, Woon and Lim are able to imply that (for example) those who believe in a universal moral standard is also incapable of reasoned dialogue, and hence disavow any responsibility to engage these people. Similarly, by an implicit suggestion that extreme views must be obviously wrong by virtue of their extremism, they can lump those who believe in universal human rights with those extremists whom most people would agree are obviously wrong, and hence avoid having to actually argue that universal human rights don’t exist.

It should also be clear that using the label ‘extremist’ as a pejorative to describe those who think that their moral standards apply to all of humanity is disingenuous. For it is hardly extremist to think that, for example, child abuse is wrong regardless of the society in which it happens.

That completes points 1 and 2 in my summary of what’s wrong with Woon and Lim’s arguments. What I’ve said has also brushed up against part of point 3. Human rights advocates like MARUAH are making their points from an assumption that universal human rights actually exist. As Siew Kum Hong has pointed out, the fact that Singapore is even a member of the UN implies that we accept the existence of some universal human rights. So were the politicians that had Singapore join the UN extremists? We know that the UN is more often toothless than not, but even if we can’t take its declaration of human rights that seriously, surely the fact that we don’t think of the UN as an extremist organisation suggests that the values in imperfectly tries to follow are not, in fact, extreme? Woon and Lim’s reactions to the notion of universal human rights make it seem as though there has been this horrifying revival of an extremist religion going on since the end of WWII, ever since, in fact, people in many countries decided that it’d be good to have some guidelines about how we should treat other human beings. Without any exceptions for those who happen to find it culturally required to, um, murder people of other ethnicities. Yet, by the way Woon talks about universal human rights (”zealotry”), one would think he was going: OMG!! Who are these people who think no one should ever enslave or torture another human being?? I would like to turn the tables on Woon: going by how he makes the notion of human rights entirely society-dependent, one would be tempted to label him an extreme relativist.

Which brings me to point 4. Woon retreats to relativism to shrug off the validity of universal human rights — rights, he says, differ from society to society. Yet while slamming human rights activists for believing that “there is only one permissible view of human rights”, he still wields the stick of absolute morality when he trumpets the power of obligations (to society) to overrule [presumably individual] rights. He has a particular view of the relationship between rights and obligations that he thinks is permissible, and which does not permit the notion of universal human rights. How does that count as not having “one permissible view of human rights”? If he wants to retreat to relativism, then he cannot use the example of those who insult religions as a paradigm of something that is morally wrong.

In short, Woon and Lim have no shortage of rhetoric but lack a serious critique of universal human rights. Even their ad hominem critique of advocates of universal human rights falls flat. Stop the careless name-calling, define the issue at hand clearly, and define the terms you use clearly. Then we can have some constructive discussion.

P. S. I am aware that this piece glosses over many points of contention in moral philosophy. I apologise. My only excuse is that I never had a formal course in ethics after Aristotle. Nevertheless, I suspect that most philosophers would agree with the main thrust of my criticisms of Woon and Lim.

Curious Indignation

I’ve never gotten why people think that five minutes of illegal parking does not constitute illegal parking. After all, the rule is, you have to pay for a parking coupon for any length of time you’re parked there. Whatsoever. Where is this sub-clause that if you hog the place for only five minutes, you get to not pay at all?

Let’s ignore the fact that there’s no way to verify that you’ve really only been five minutes there, so allowing people to plead ‘only five minutes’ as an excuse would basically allow anyone who was ever fined to repeal their fines. Even if there was a way to verify thus, I still don’t see where the rule that five minutes doesn’t count comes from.

Here’s a consequentialist reason for charging even for five minutes: That five minutes of illegal parking is still an injustice — you’re still either obstructing traffic or depriving someone willing to pay legally for the place of a place. Of course, because of the rigidity of parking coupon prices in Singapore, the market often doesn’t clear and there are excess parking lots etc., but in order for us to have a coupon system at all, we have to accept these inconveniences and continue enforcing the rules that allow the market to clear as far as it can in other areas.

Another argument is that the chance of getting caught for any given five minute parking offence is very low. Most people who get caught have committed this offence multiple times until the low odds caught up with them. So they have really ‘cheated’ taxpayers (who subsidize HDB parking lots) of many, many blocks of five minutes. Again, the summons system is such that there will be a few unfortunate souls who get caught on their only offence, but these will be firmly in the minority.

In any case, I’ve never understood how you can stand splashing out on a car in Singapore and squeal about the comparatively tiny cost of a parking fine.